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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs. -

C. W. BRADY, JR.,

Case No.
10653

Defendent-Appellan t.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, C. W. "Buck" Brady, Jr., appeals
from his conviction of first degree perjury in violation of Section 76-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
upon jury trial in the District Court of Salt Lake
County. The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, judge,
sitting at request.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was indicted for the crime of first
degree perjury by a grand jury convened during
1965 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Appellant
made several pretrial motions to quash the indict-
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ment, which were denied by the trial court. The appellant stood mute at the time of arraignment, an:l
a plea of not guilty was entered. A motion to suppress certain evidence given before the HonorablG
Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the City Court of Salt
Lake City, was filed and denied. Upon jury trial, th,:
appellant was found guilty and judgment was subsequently pronounced. A motion for new trial was
filed and denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts as being more in keeping with ruie
that the evidence on cippeal will be viewed in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict.
The indictment in the instant case charged the
appellant with the commission of perjury in the first
degree on May 7, 1965, by falsely testifying before
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, a magistrate and city
judge of the City Court of Salt Lake City (R. 1). The
indictment returned by the Salt Lake County Grand
Jury against the appellant sets out various particulars in which it is claimed that the appellant perjured himself.
The first allegation material to this appeal, in
view of the trial court's instructions, is captioned "A"
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the Schedule A of the Appendices to the appellant's brief and qoes to the question as to whether,
subsequent to the time the appellant returned to
Salt Lake after a trip to Indiana to view a "bitpaver,"
the county was testing a bitpaver and whether
there were reports submitted to the appellant as to the results of any test. The appellant responded to each of the questions posed on the subject in testifying before Judge Jones and said in effoct that the county was testing the bitpaver and
that Mr. Ner din had contacted him "quite frequently and went out to the scene quite frequently to
see the tests."

ii1

The second area of the indictment where the
State contended the appellant had committed perjury is that identified in the appellant's brief by the
letter "B'' in Schedule A of the Appendices. This
testimony given before Judge Jones by the appellant was to the effect that the bitpaver machine was
used in the Chesterfield area right up until Christmastime. Also encompassed in the appellant's
testimony at this time was a statement that he did
not know that the bitpaver had not been used in
January through February, 1964, nor did he remember discussing the fact with a member of the Indiana Toll Road Commission that they would not
use their bitpaver subsequent to Labor Day and
until the following May.
The third area of the indictment, referenced as
letter "C" in Schedule A of the Appendices of appellant's brief and in relation to the portion of the

4

indictment that the court instructed on in Instruction No. 6, was testimony by the appellant that the
bitpaver machine was used up until December, 1963
when weather moved in, and that the machine had
been left in Chesterfield; and, subsequently, the
mo.chine was taken from Chesterfield back to the
county road shops sometime in January.
The fourth portion of the appellant's testimony
which the court instructed on as being false in Instruction No. 6 is that portion set out in referenced
letter "D" of Schedule A of the Appendices of the
appellant's brief as to the type of equipment that
the appellant had leased in the past for the county.
The appellant replied that a garbage packer and
some sweepers had been leased.
The four areas indicated above were those
areas which the trial court instructed the jury in relationship to the evidence and, consequently, those
areas upon which the facts must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine if
that evidence is sufficient as a matter 0£ record to
support the jury's conclusion.
Judqe Maurice D. Jones of the City Court ot
Salt Lake City was called as a witness (R. 108). He
testified that plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which is a John
Doe complaint, charged the suspect with accessory
to the crime of attempting to bribe an executive officer, and was prepared by the Salt Lake County
Attorney's office. He issued the complaint on April
22, 1965 (R. 108). He stated that the complaint was
never given a file number and that the carbon and
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original of the complaint were apparently left with
the Salt Lake County Attorney after the hearing and
at the time a sscond complaint was issued against
appellant (R. 109, 110, 112). Up until that time, Judge
Jones kept the John Doe complaint in his possession.
Subsequent to the issucince of the complaint, the a_ppellant, C. W. "Buck" Brady, appeared before Judg:::
Jones, when the complaint VvJ.s in his possession.
He appeared with CO"!.,msel a.nd was sworn by Judo,e
Jones 0nd. thereafter, testified. Judge Jones interroqated the appellant on a question end answer basis
c::mcerning certain activities of the appellant as
Chairman of the S3lt Lake County Commission and
head of the Div~sion of Roads and Bridges and,
rn.ore specifically, with reference to the lease by the
co'-lnty of a bitpaver (Tr. 114). (plaintiffs Exhibit 2)
Mr. Ned Greenig testiiied that on May 7, 1965.
he was the court reporter who took the testimony
of the appellant during the interrogation conducted
by Judge Jones (Tr. 116). Exhibit 2 was admitted into
evidence and rea.d to the jury and formed the basis
of the alleged fab::: tsstimony for which the app2llant was charged with perjury. The appellant testified before Judge Jones in accordance with the ol.ltlined categories noted above and indicated, with
some particularity, that the bit;.:iaver machine leassd
from Midvale Motors, Inc., was used in the Chesterfield area, Salt Lake County, up until approximately
Christmastime (plaintiff's Exhibit 2).
Mr. Hubert H. Nielsen testified that he was th2
owner of a Temco Bitpaver comparable to that
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identified in plaintiffs Exhibit 3. He did business as
Bonneville Equipment Incorporated. During th'?
early part of the year 1963, he ha.cl for sale a bit.
.
l
.
h'ig hi,y
paver engme
an d pump engme,
w h'1cn
is
a~
capable piece of road rr~aintenance and construction mJchinery that mechanically lays down asphalt
and road mat (Tr. 161). The bitpaver had been used
approximately 120 hours and was a used machine
(Tr. 161). Mr. Nielsen attempted to negotiate for the
sale of the bitpaver with Salt Lake County and contacted Mr. Boyd Nerdin, Superintendent of the Sol\
Lake County Roads and Bridges (Tr. 161). This \Vus
in, approximately, May of 1963 (Tr. 161). Initial negotiations were conducted and a second conversrltion was had behNeen Nielsen and Nerdin at Nie~
sen's home. Nerdin indicated that possibly the ap
pellant, Mr. Brady, might be interested in the m~
chine for the county (Tr. 164). Mr. Nielsen wa.s advised by Mr. Nerdin to contact Mr. Ted Newsor,1
as an individual close to Mr. Brady (Tr. 165). The
testimony with reference to the advice was not offered as to the truth of what was said, but merely
to sho·.v the action taken by Mr. Nielsen after thn
advice.
lAr. l'Helsen had two mE:etings with Mr. Newsom
at vvhi:::h the bitpaver V·Tas discussed (Tr. 166-167).
and recEived an indication that the appellant, Mr
Brady, would like to see the machine in operation.
Arrangements were made bv Mr. Nielsen to take the
a:opella_nt back to the Indiana Toll Road outside of
G':LrV, Indiana, to observe a bitpaver in operation.
Mr. Nielsen ma.de arrangements to take the uppe1-

7
lant to Indiana and Mr. Newsom accompanied them
(Tr. 168). While back there, Mr. Nielsen, Mr. Newsom and the appellant observed the bitpaver in
operation and were advised by a Mr. Shemahorn
and a Mr. Ma.llott, employees of the Indiana Toll
Road, that they "put their machine to bed" at "Labor
Day, regardless of weather." (Tr. 169). Mr. Nielsen
testified that he discussed the possible purchase oi
the bitpaver by the county with the appellant in a
motel in Indiana and on the plane returning to Salt
Lake City (Tr. 170). He told the appellant that he was
interested in selling the machine and mentioned
the price of $29,000.00 (Tr. 171). The appellant indicated that he was impressed with the performance
of the machine, but had some budgetary problems
(Tr. 171). Mr. Nielsen also indicated that he suggested to the appellant that the county lease the
machine for a month or two to see how it worked
(Tr. 171).
Subsequent to returning to Salt Lake City, after
viewing the operation of the bitpaver in Indiana,
Mr. Nielsen had conversations with Mr. Newsom
in an effort to obtain the sale of the machinery to
the county (Tr. 172). He had a conversation with Mr.
Newsom on the 7th or 8th day of August, 1963, in
which Newsom indicated that the appellant was
very definitely interested in the machine, bd
that he still had budgetary problems (Tr. 173). Newsom then advised Nielsen that if he wanted to get
the machine out of his hair that he ought "to sharpen
his pencil and get down to the lowest possible
price." Newsom indicated that Midvale Motors, Inc.
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was willing to purchase the machine (Tr. 173). It
was indicated further that the county and the appellant desired to have some test of the performance
capabilities of Mr. Nielsen's bitpaver. Arrangements
were made to test the bitpaver in West Jordan, Salt
Lake County, and attempt to set up some other test
area in which to run patterns as to the machine's
performance (Tr. 17 4). A test pattern was run in the
West Jordan area. Mr. Newsom advised Mr. Nielsen
that he was president and major owner of Midvale
Motors, Inc. (Tr. 175). This statement by Mr. Newsom was apparently untrue, as Mr. John K. Russell
testified that he was the accountant for Motor Lease,
Inc. and that Mr. Neuman C. Petty was the president and majority stockholder of Midvale Motors,
Inc., and that to his knowledge, Mr. Ted Newsom
had no position with Midvale Motors, Inc. A sale
of the equipment was made by Mr. Nielsen to Midvale Motors, Inc., on August 22, 1963, for the sum
of $18,700.00. Mr. Nielsen was paid a cashier's check
signed by Ted M. Newsom as president of Midvale
Motors, Inc. (Tr. 176). Mr. Nielsen, prior to the sale
of the bitpaver to Midvale Motors, Inc., had submitted an offer to Mr. Newsom clo Motor Lease, Inc.,
indicating a purchase price of $29,950.00 (Tr. 178).
(defendant's Exhibit 5). This is approximately the
same price for which the machine had been offered
to Salt Lake County.
Subsequent to the purchase of the machine by ,
Midvale Motors, Inc., a lease was negotiated between Midvale Motors, Inc., and the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County (Exhibit 4-P).
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The lease was for five consecutive months, commencing on the 23rd of August, 1963, and ending
on the 22nd day of February, 1964, and provided
for a $4,000.00 per month rental. The lease also provided that all payments were to be made prior to
December 31, 1963, but that the lease was cancE::lable. At the time of the lease, Commissioners
Cannon and Jensen were present, and the lease
was approved (Tr. 184). The record reflected that
on December 23, 1963, the appellant sent a letter
to the Salt Lake County Auditor, requesting payment of $4,000.00 on the lease rental. All previous
payments had been made.
Mr. John Van Ausdal, an employee of Salt Lake
County Roads and Bridges Division, testified tha.t
he had been operating the bitpaver ever since 1959,
and prior to his employment with Salt Lake County,
was employed by Bonneville Equipment Co. (Tr.
209). Mr. Van Ausdal started to work for the county
using the bitpaver before the first lease with the
county was consummated. He also testified that he
laid down test patterns for the county prior to the
sale of the bitpaver (Tr. 210). He indicated that the
bitpaver had not been used subsequent to Thanksgiving day, 1963 because of brake damage (Tr. 211),
and that its use immediately prior to breakdown was
in the Chesterfield area of Salt Lake County (Tr. 211).
He testified that after the bitpaver was shut down in
November of 1963, it was not again used by the
county until April or May of 1964. He further said
the bitpaver was taken to the county shops at the
same time the use was discontinued (Tr. 211, 212).
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Mr. Stanley Thayne testified that he was th2
"seal coat foreman" for the Salt Lake County Roads
and Bridges Division and that the bitpaver was used
for the last time in the year 1963 around the 15th
or 20th of November. He further testified that th0
machine was brought into the Salt Lake County
Road Shops before Thanksgiving, and was not subsequently used until May of 1966 (Tr. 221, 222).
Mr. Joe Riccardi, office clerk of the Salt Lab?
County Roads and Bridges Division, indicated that
employees kept daily time sheets and that a daily
report on the "chips" spread by the bitpaver was
kept by him (Tr. 235). The report was prepared by
Mr. Riccardi from information and documents supplied by employees of the Salt Lake County Roads
and Bridges Division, and entries were made in the
report periodically. Exhibit 21 was the report for
the period of the lease between Midvale Motors,
Inc., and Salt Lake County, entered into in Augus1
of 1963. It showed that there were no chips spread
after November 15, and that the work done by the
spreader at that time had been in the Chesterfield
area of Salt Lake County. In addition, reports from
the Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges Division
showed that the bitpaver received little or no gasr1line and oil servicing subsequent to November of
1963 (plaintiff's Exhibit 20). Records in the county
road shops disclose that there were no asphalt oils
purchased by Salt Lake County from its two distribi.itors for use with the bitpaver after November 4, 1963
(plaintiff's Exhibits 16 and 17). Testimony was also
received thci_t the bitpaver could not operate in wet
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weather, and Exhibit 23 received by the court on
stipulation, showed the local climatologicel data. Ior
Salt Lake County in the months of November and
December, which indicated substantial precipitaticn
from the 15th of November on in 1963. On the 15th
of November, Salt Lake Valley received 5.8 inches
of snow (p. 1 Exhibit 23).
The payments on the lease of August 23, 1963,
had been paid by check of $8,000.00 on September
26, $4,000.00 on October 25, $4,000.00 on December
23, and $4,000.00 on January 10. (plaintiff's Exhibit
31). The appellant, on December 2, 1963, requested
approval of the payment of $4,000.00 to Midvale
Motors, Inc., for the rental of the bitpaver by the
Salt Lake County Department of Roads and Bridges
during the month of November. On December 23,
1963, a letter was sent by the appellant to the SaH
Lake County Board of County Commissioners requesting payment of $4,000.00 to Midvale Motors,
Inc., for the rental of the bitpaver during the mont:-i
of December.
Mr. Thomas McKean, a sales engineer for Cate's
Equipment Co., testified that an Alles-Chalmer's tractor was sold to Motor Lease, Inc. of Salt Lake County
for $43,851.00. Exhibits 15, 18, and 19, which wer2
received by the court, disclose that Motor Lease,
Inc., had proposed in May of 1963 to lease the tractor to Salt Lake County for a 48-month period at
$1,994.00 per month. Commissioner Marvin G. Je:::-csen testified that the agreement was neve:::- completed, because he questioned the appellant on
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whether the lease rental was excessive (Tr. 267).
Commissioner Jensen testified that he told the appellant that the proposed lease contract with Motor
Lease, Inc., would be in excess of $80,000.00 and
not in the best interest of the county, since the same
piece of equipment could be purchased for $53,000.00 (Tr. 268-269). Commissioner Jensen testified
that the lease with Motor Lease, Inc., to lease the
tractor for one month (plaintiff's Exhibit 18) was
entered into because the county had already been
using the equipment. Subsequently, a lease from
June 15, 1963, to June 14, 1965, was entered into by
Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges and Motor
Lease, Inc., whereby Motor Lease, Inc., leased to
the county the same tractor referred to above. The
lease was signed by Ted Newsom as manager for
Motor Lease, Inc., and ran from the 15th day of
June, 1963, to the 14th day of June, 1965, or a period
of 24 months. The lease was for $3,000.00 the first
six months and $1,080.00 per month for the remaining 18 months (plaintiff's Exhibit 19). Commissioner
Jensen testified that proposed leases on equipment
would come through the Salt Lake County Roads
and Bridges Department, which was hea.ded by the
appellant. The two leases with Motor Lease, Inc.,
for the tractor did not go through the commission
because of Commissioner Jensen's apparent unfamiliarity with the procedure.
Subsequent to the expiration of the lease be
tween Midvale Motors, Inc., and Salt Lake County
Roads and Bridges, on the 15th day of June, 1964,
the appellant, acting for the Board of County Com-
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m1ss10ners of Salt Lake, executed a second lease
with Midvale Motors, Inc., for the lease of the bHpaver from the 1st day of June, 1964, to the 30th d3-y
of November, 1964, for $4,000.00 at the time of execution and five equal payments of $4,000.00 (Tr. l 9G).
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding the appellant guilty of perjury in the first degree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE PERJURY.

The appellant contends that the evidence offered at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The respondent submits that the evidence presented amply supports the conviction, when thG
case is reviewed in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. In State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347
P.2d 865 (1959), this court observed as to the proper
manner of viewing a contention that evidence offered at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict:
"The rules governing the scope of review on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses
and to determine the facts; that the evidence will be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict;
and that if when so viewed it appears that the jury
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acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendent
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not
be disturbed."

Section 76-45-1(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
defines perjury as follows:
"A person is guilty of perjury who
(1) Swears or affirms that he will truly testify,
declare, depose or certify, or that any testimony, declaration, deposition, certificate, affidavit or other
writing by him subscribed is true, in, or in connection
with, any action or special proceeding, hearing or inquiry, or on any occasion in which an oath is required
by law or is necessary for the prosecution or defense
of a private right or for the ends of public justice or
may lawfully be administered, and who in such action
or proceeding or on such hearing, inquiry or other
occasion wilfully and knowingly testifies, declares,
deposes or certifies falsely or states in his testimony,
declaration, deposition, affidavit or certificate any
matter to be true which he knows to be false."

Section 76-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
defines perjury in the first degree as follows:
"A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree who commits perjury as to any material matter
in or in connection with any action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or any hearing or inquiry
involving the ends of public justice or on an occasion
in which an oath or affirmation is required or may
lawfully be administered."

Consequently, before this court may overturn
the appellant's conviction of perjury in the first de-
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gree, it must find from viewing the evidence in a
light most favorably against the appellant that no
reasonable jury or judge could have concluded
that the evidence presented demonstrated a violation of the above cited statutes.
Further, although the trial court instructed on
four general areas of appellant's testimony before
Judge Jones, if the evidence is sufficient to show
perjury in reference to any particular of the testimony given, the fact that with reference to other
matters concerning which appellant testified, th(~
evidence was not sufficient, will not preclude cor:.viction and affirr'lance by this court.
In State v. Anderson, 35 Utah 496, 101 Pac. 385

(l 909), this court observed:

"The information contains several assignments
of perjury not here enumerated, which contain statements alleged to have been made by defendant in
the same case, and at the same time, and of the same
general character as the foregoing; but the court, in
its instructions to the jury, withdrew all except those
we have enumerated from their consideration. It will
be observed that the several assignments contained
in the information consist of certain alleged successive statements made by defendant while testifying
as a witness, and are so related to the one question
which was the subject-matter of inquiry in the action
in which the testimony was given, and were so linked
and blended together in the point of time, as to constitute but one act or transaction, and therefore constitute but one offense. And, furthermore, the authorities seem to uniformly hold that all matters to which
the defendant swore falsely may be embraced in one
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count (2 Wharton's Crim. Law, sections 1299, 1301;
Wharton's Crim. Proc. and Pr., 251; Commonwealth
v. Jones, 6 Gray [Mass.] 275; Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 122 Mass. 449; Adellberger v. State [Tex.
Cr. App.], 39 S.W. 103; De Bernie v. State, 10 Ala.
23; Railroad v. Callahan, 6 B. and C. 109). And
proof of the falsity of any one of them will support a
general verdict of guilty (such as was rendered in
this case), although the other assignments in the information are not sustained by the evidence. ( 2
Wharton's Crim. Law [9 Ed.], section 1301; Wharton's Crim. Ev. [9 Ed.], 131; 16 Ency. Pl. and Pr.,
350.)
We find no error in the record. The judgment is
affirmed." (Emphasis added)

This position is very much in accord with overwhelming majority of cases and authorities. 41 Am.
Jur., Perjury, sec. 47; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 10th Ed., sec. 131; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law,
12th Ed., sec. 1567; State v. Taylor. 202 Mo. 1, 100
S.W. 41; Arena v. United States. 226 F.2d 227 (9th
Cir. 1955); United States v. Crummer. 151 F.2d 958
(10th Cir. 1945).
Consequently, if the evidence is sufficient on
any particular of the indictment, the conviction must
be affirmed.
In addition, the State submits that the contention of appellant set forth on page 4 of appellant's
brief that proof of the perjury must be shown by
direct and positive testimony of two witnesses or
one witness and corroborating evidence is not
necessarily the rule applicable in Utah. The Com-
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piled Laws of Utah 1907 § 4748; Compiled Laws of
Utah 1917 § 8848; Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 §
105-21-21 provided in part:
"Perjury must be proved by the testimony of
two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances.''

See State v. Gleason. 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 (1935).
This provision, however, was subsequently repealed in 1935 with the adoption of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Laws of Utah 1935, Ch. 118, § 1.
Consequently, there is an express legislative repeal
of the two witness rule etc., and it must be concluded that the present rule is simply whether, taking the evidence as a whole, reasonable men could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of
an accused. The abandonment of the more rigid
rules of proof is noted in 41 Am. Jur., Perjury. § 67,
where it is observed:
"Although it seems once to have been the rule
that to support a conviction of perjury the evidence
of two witnesses was required to establish the falsity
of the oath on which the indictment was based, it is
now well settled that such a conviction may be had on
the evidence of one witness supported by proof or
corroborating circumstances, or by the testimony of
two witnesses, or, where it is so provided by statute,
by the accused's own confession in open court."

See also 88 A.L.R.2d 852, 864.
Taking even the standard urged by appellant
instead of a general standard normally applicable
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in criminal cases, it is clear that the evidence in this
case is amply sufficient to sustain the conviction.

A.

Testing the Bitpaver.

The respondent agrees that the evidence pr'?sented at the time of trial was not sufficient to
sustain a conviction based on alleged fa_lsity of appellant's statements with reference to the testing of
the bitpaver. The prosecution, at the time of argument, acknowledged to the jury the fact that the
State did not rely on that portion of the indictment
to support a conviction.

B.

time.

The Use of the Bitpaver Up to Christmas-

It is submitted that the evidence on this issue
is ample to sustain the appellant's conviction no matter what rule is applied. The appellant's testimony
before Judge Jones was to the effect that the bitpaver was used "right up until Christmas." He expressly told Judge Jones: "We used this machine
up until December, I'm sure, right until Christmastime." (Exhibit P-2). Thus . appellant's testimony before Judge Jones, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, shows a definite and positive assertion by the appellant that the bitpaver
machine was being used right up until Christmas
of 1963. The machine was being leased by appellant's department for $4,000.00 per month, and thsfailure to use the machine during the period of the
le:Ise, where the lease was cancelable by the county at any time, would strongly evidence that Mr.
Brady was not looking out for the best interests of
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the citizenry in administering his department. Fu:::ther, the lease price, itself, when appra.ised against
the recent sales price of the machine immediately
before the county leased it, makes the lease relationship suspect. Therefore, any inquiry relating to
the actual use of the machine would be directly
material to any inquiry concerning Commissioner
Brady's administration of the County Roads and
Bridges Division. Further, when Exhibit P-2 showed
that the appellant acknowledged that Ted Newsom,
who had purchased the machine and was connected with the lessor, had put up money ($2,000.00)
for the purchase of property in Park City in which
the appellant was to have an interest and the appellant had, as yet, paid nothing, for the use of th9
property (Exhibit P-2, pp. 26, 27, 28). The testimony,
therefore, related to whether the payments made
for the machine were actually needed or a means
whereby county money was placed in the hands of
the appellant's friends, who in turn returned it to
the appellant in order to continue to do business
vrith the county.
The jury was legitimately within its province

if it found that the appellant, by his testimony be-

fore Judge Jones, was deliberately and knowingly
trying to communicate the contention that the bitpaver had been used as much as possible and had
not set idle for a long period while rental was paid
on it. The appellant's testimony was a direct assertion that the machine had been used up until
Christmas. He interjected this assertion to rebut the
contention implicit in Judge Jones' question that
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normal use of the machine would dictate putting
it up on Labor Day and the appellant knew this,
and thus, the lease was a coverup. The appellant
had requested payment for the use of the machine
under the lease during the month of December. If
the machine had remained idle during this period,
the appellant's motives would necessarily be
suspect. Therefore, the straightforward declarations of the appellant that the machine was used up
until Christmas clearly were knowingly and intentionally made, and the jury could reasonably so
conclude. Appellant argues that it was a statement
only of his belief, and there was no evidence that
would show the falsity of his belief. This is a failure
to appraise the evidence in the required light and
also an argumentative assertion in the face of the
direct statement of the appellant, "We used this
machine up until December, I'm sure, right until
Christmastime."
Clearly, the testimony of the appellant was
proved false. Clearly, the testimony was false. Mr.
John Van Ausdal, an employee of the Salt Lake
County Roads and Bridges Division, testified that
he had been the operator of the bitpaver since it
was first used in 1959. He was responsible for lts
use. He had used the machine when it was owned
by Bonneville Equipment Co. and had become an
employee of the county when the machine was
leased to the county. His testimony was clear and
direct that the bitpaver had not been used subsequent to Thanksgiving day in 1963, because of brake
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damage and was not used again until April or May
of 1964.
Mr. Stanley Thayne testified that he was the
"seal coat foreman" and was directly familiar with
the use of the bitpaver. He testified that the machine
was last used around the 15th or 20th of November,
1963, and brought into the Salt Lake County Road
Shops before Thanksgiving and not subsequently
used until May of 1966. Thus, two witnesses have
specifically testified to the falsity of the appellant's
statements, under oath, to Judge Jones. This is, itself,
sufficient to sustain the conviction. The appellant,
by his own testimony, indicated that he knew the
ti~e the machine was used. Further, his statement
was much more than mere opinion or belief. It was
a statement of fact, calculated to justify his misconduct.
In addition, Exhibit P-21, which was a record
prepared daily by Mr. Joe Riccardi of the use of the
bitpaver to spread chips, showed no chips were
spread after November 15, 1963. The appellant
assails the admission of the record because it was
based on other information supplied by employees
of the county to Mr. Riccardi. Appellant contends
that the slips or documents on which the record
was based must be produced under the theory of
summary of voluminous records doctrine. Appellant
misconstrues the law. The instant record was one
kept in the regular course of business in the daily
operations of the county. As such, it was admissible
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in its own right. Thus, in 20 Am. Jur., Evidence,
1051, it is noted:

§

"It has become the rule in a great majority of
the states to admit entries in books made in the ordinary course of business at or near the time of the
transaction to which they relate, where properly authenticated according to the requirements of the particular jurisdiction."

The fact that the record may be based on otk~r
documents or information supplied is of no consequence, if the record, itself, is not prepared for the
litigation and is kept as part of the regular course
of business of the party or entity. Thus, in 20 Am.
Jur., Evidence§ 1061, it is stated:
"Within the contemplation of the shopbook rule,
the construction or form of the documents and the
material used are not matters of importance if they
are capable of perpetuating a record of events, and
the charges thereon are fairly and honestly made in
the regular course of business and as a part of the
party's system of keeping his accounts, at or about
the time of the transaction noted."

In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 1062, it is observed:
"Entries in books, in order to be admissible,
ordinarily must have been made in the regular course
of business and as a part of the party's system of
keeping his accounts. The fact that the entries are
made by clerks in the regular routine of their employment and under the natural impulse of employees
to perform their duties accurately is the safeguard
of the accuracy of them. Indeed, under the systems
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of bookkeeping in modern business houses, the mechanical precision with which numerous employees
record various transactions, together with the absence
of any personal motive to misrepresent the facts of
the transactions, makes the modern book of accounts
a very high form of evidence in respect of transactions
that are the proper subject matter for a book of accounts."

It is recognized by the courts that many entries
of records are based on intermediate slips and accounts, but this does not preclude the admissibility
of the evidence. In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 1066,
it is acknowledged:
"Under the modern methods of conducting business, the information relative to the transactions
constituting the book accounts often must pass
through various hands before being permanently recorded and some system of providing temporary
memoranda preparatory to the permanent records is
necessary in order to insure accuracy. It would be
impracticable to preserve for any great length of time
the tags, slips, or other tokens constituting such original memoranda and impossible, in view of the everchanging army of employees, to obtain the testimony
of the person who made the temporary memoranda
or conducted the transaction. Hence, following the
rule of necessity which originated the admissibility
of books of account in evidence, the courts do not regard such temporary memoranda as the original entries, but look to the permanent records as such original entries, where properly verified."

The rule relating to the introduction of a summary of bulky documents too numerous to be prop-
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erly handled in court is wholly unrelated to the rule
dealing with business records, but relates to a situation where the documents themselves are the subject to be considered and a summary is made of
their content. See 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 449, and
more particularly, pp. 364 to 399, where it is clear
that the voluminous documents rule is one relating
to the best evidence rule as evidentiary proposition
of no significance concerning Exhibit 21. This principle should be compared against the rule of business entries to which Exhibit 21 applies.
McCormick, Evidence, p. 600, notes as to the
type of evidence admitted here:
"Under this principle, the cash-book, and the
day-book or journal, recording the transactions in
chronological order and made up either from original
entries or from entries taken from temporary slips
or memoranda, would be admissible as the first permanent record. Upon the same basis, a ledger or other
similar book, wherein the items of debit and credit
are arranged under the names of the parties concerned, when made up day by day from memory or directly from the original slips or memoranda, would also
be admissible. And where the ledger is made, not
from memory or from the original slips, but from the
journal, day-book and cash-book which are, in turn,
based on the original slips, but is regularly, promptly, and systematically kept and is used and relied on
in the operation of the business, it would seem that
there could still be no sound reason against the ledger's admissibility. It is far more convenient for use
in evidence than the slips or the journal, when the
purpose is to reveal the whole state of an account.
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See Model Evidence Act (1927); Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act §§ 1, 2 (McCormick, supra,
p. 607). See also, Joseph v. W. H. Groves Lauer-Day
Saints Hospiial, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957);
Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah
268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952); Polasky and Paulson, Business Entries, 4 Utah L. Rev. 327 (1955). Consequently, the appellant's contention that Exhibit 21 is unavailable to support the conviction is wholly unmeritorious.
Finally, the evidence as to the servicing of the
machine and purchases of gasoline and asphalt
show the bitpaver was not used, as the appellant
testified. Also, the weather reports belie the claim
of use after November 15, 1963. Under the circumstances, the evidence was more than sufficient to
support the jury's determination.

C. Taking the Bitpaver to the Shops in January.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show perjury, as respects the appellant's testimony as to when the bitpaver was taken
back to the county shops. Again, the appellant, in
his brief, fails to appraise the evidence in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, but rather,
makes his argument from the opposite position and
argumentatively contends for every inference in
the evidence in his own favor.
The appellant appeared before Judge Jones
and stated that the bitpaver remained in the Chesterfield area of Salt Lake County and was not moved
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back to the Salt Lake County Road Shops until sometime in January, 1964. It should be remembered thf'.t
the lease in question was for five months duration
-which would have terminated sometime in January, although the lease did say it was to continue
until February 22, 1964. The appellant obviously
could not explain why, if the bitpaver had not been
used since November 15, 1963, the lease was not
cancelled, or why the lease payment was made in
December, when the bitpaver was not used and
where the contract was cancellable. By telling Judge
Jones that the machine had been in Chesterfield
obviously would tend to support a contention that
the machine was intended to be used in December
and January if possible. This statement would be a
justification, although a feeble one, for not canceling the lease and saving the county money for January and December. The January money, aJthough
prepaid, could have been recovered. If, as was
suspected, the lease arrangement was one whereby
lvfidvale Motors, Inc. would get additional money
and the apnellant would get a kickback or free use
of a vehide during his campaigns, the contentioD
that the machine was not brought back to the shops
until January would support an argument of legitimate use or inadvertence. However, since the machine was returned to the shops in November, the
appellant, as head of the department, should have
acted to cancel the lease, unless there was some
hidden reason for not doing so which was what
Judge Jones was making inquiry as to. Thus, the
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question was very material to the inquiry. The appellant made a flat assertion that he knew the m::i.chine was in Chesterfield until sometime in January.
Thus, there is ample evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that the appellant knowlingly and wilfully intended to mislead Judge Jones in order to
cover up his own inaction.
The evidence is very specific in showing the
date the machine was returned to the shops. Mr.
Van Ausdal, the operator, specifically testified that
the machine was taken to the shops at the time the
brake coupling broke (Tr. 211). Mr. Stanley Thayne
testified:
"Q Do you recall when it was brought into
the shop, was it before or after Thanksgiving
of 1963?
A

I believe it was before."

He further indicated that it was only about ten
days after the breakdown that it was returned (Tr.
221). Finally, he indicated that there was no snovr
when the bitpaver was returned and there was five
inches of snow received on the 15th of November.
Consequently, the evidence was strong that the
machine did not remain in the Chesterfield area
until sometime in January. Further, the chip reports
tend to corroborate the testimony of both witnesses.
Thus, there was ample evidence to warrant the jury
returning a conviction, 41 Am. Jur., Perjury§ 67. The
matter was clearly one for the jury. Fletcher v. State,
20 Wyo. 284, 123 Pac. 80 (1912); Ayers v. State, 20
Ariz. 189, 178 Pac. 782 (1918). As noted in the cited
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cases, the question of intent, knowledge or willfulness in such cases, as well as materially, to some
extent, is one of fact for the jury.

D. Other Property Leased by the County.
The final area where the respondent submits
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's
determination of guilt is that portion of the indictment charging that the appellant falsely testified as
to other equipment that had been leased by the
county. A reading of Exhibit P-2 makes it clear that
Judge Jones was inquiring of ex-Commissioner
Brady as to what other forms of equipment the Department of Roads and Bridges leased in order to
determine whether the bitpaver incident, wherein
a piece of equipment was leased for two separate
occasions and the total amount paid by the county
was more than twice the cost to the lessor, was a
single affair or whether it was one of a pattern. The
appellant's answer was clear that the other leased
items were of minimal importance, a garbage truck
or a sweeper. The appe1l0.nt made no mention of
the lea.sing of the Alles-Chalmers Crawler Tractor
from Motor Lease, Inc.
The reason for the appellant's non-disclosure
is obvious. Motor Lease, Inc. is a corporation with
which Ted Newsom, who was connected with the
bitn:i.ver deal, was associated. Two leases covering
the equipment were executed, both signed by
Newsom and both leased for the Division of Roads
and Bridges, which was appellant's department.
The first lease (Exhibit P-18) was for a one month
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period at $3,000.00. It was executed because a prnvious lease (Exhibit P-15) was not executed for reasons which are apparent and will be discussed la.ter.
The second lease (Exhibit P-19) was from June 15,
1963, to June 14, 1965, and, thus, was still in effect
whe the appellant testified before Judge Jones on
May 7, 1965. The second lease was for $3,000.00 for
the first six months and $1,880.00 for the remaining
eighteen months. Thus, the total amount the county
was required to pay under the lease was $51,840.00,
when the lease ran for only two years. Mr. Thomas
McKean, a sales engineer for Cate Equipment Company, testified that the tractor was sold to Motor
Lease, Inc. for $43,851.00 on the 21st of May, 1963, d
few days before a proposed lease (Exhibit P-15) between Motor Lease, Inc. and the county was to have
commenced. Further, the first lease (Exhibit P-18)
ran from the 15th day of May or before Motor Lease,
Inc. even had purchased the equipment from Cate
for resale to the county.
Although Exhibits 18 and 19 were executed by
Commissioner Marvin G. Jensen for the county, they
were entered into on behalf of the Division of Roads
and Bridges, of which the appellant was in charge
(Tr. 263). Commissioner Jensen merely executed the
leases because the purchasing department was
under his iurisdicition. He testified that he would
not interefere with the internal operations of Roads
and Bridges (Tr. 264). Jensen testified that Roads and
Bridges would draw up the specifications or the
commissioner in charge would indicate the equip-
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ment he needed a_nd "make recommendations for
the leasing of the equipment." (Tr. 264).
Jensen said with reference to Exhibit 15, a proposed lease, that he had a conversation with the appellant. He testified:
"A. Something Jike that Commissioner Brady
asked me if I had signed this and I to]d him I hadn't
and he stated the urgency of getting the piece of
equipment, something to this effect, and he said, I
told him "I wouldn"t sign it." He said, "if you don't
sign it or else, he would bring it before the county
commission." At that time I told him that if he wanted to bring it before the commission why it would
be fine, if you want to taJk to me about this after the
commission meeting I will be happy to point out
some of the factors in the contract."

He then said after the meeting that he pointed
out a few facts to the appellant, mainly that the lease
was for over $80,000. m Thereafter, the lease was
dropped and the two leases, totalling $54,840.00 were
executed. The importance of Exhibit 15 could hardly
be said to inflame the jury, as appellant so theatrically suggests; rather, it was shown that the appellant
was well aware of the circumstances leading up to
the two leases he failed to disclose to Judge Jones,
and that his motive may well have been to cover
up the proposed lease in order to avoid the obvious
inference that the bitpaver was not the only questionable transaction in which the appellant, New(1)

It should be remembered that Motor Lease, Inc. was going to purchase
the machine for $43,851.00.
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som and Neuman C. Petty(2) were involved. Consequently, it was most relevant evidence.
Further, the two leases executed were in excess
of the purchase price and undoubtedly could ha-1e
reflected upon the appellant, thus providing the
reason for the failure to disclose and for giving of
the false testimony as to the leases entered into by
the county. Further, since the appellant had told
Jensen of the urgency of the need for the equipment and there was the exchange between the appellant and Jensen, this, when coupled with the
fact that the leases were for the appellant's department, that he had knowledge of the impending
transaction, that requests to lease were initia_ted
from the deportment concerned with a recommendation for leasing, and the one lease was still in
effect when the appellant testified, shows that there
is ample evidence on which the jury could have
concluded that the appellant intentionally failed to
disclose the existence of the other leases with the
persons who had previously testified (a fact of which
Brady was appraised).
Since questions of intent in perjury cases are
usually for the jury, this court could not conclude
that the jury and trial court were amiss in this instance. The California court in People Vo Morris, 138
Cal.App.2d 317, 292 P.2d 15 (1956), in the face of
comparable contentions, affirmed the conviction. In
People v. Dixon, 99 Cal.App.2d 94, 221 P.2d 198
(2) Brady was advised that Neuman C. Pettv had already testified before
Judge Jones as had Ted Newsom (Exhibit P2, p. 2).
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(1950), the court observed:
"In every case perjury must be knowingly false,
and in every case the defendant's actual state of mind
cannot be directly proved. It is for the jury to say
in every case of perjury whether the defendant believed the truth of his testimony when he gave it."

When the inferences that may be drawn from
the record are weighed in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, the court must conclude that there
is sufficient evidence to convict on the testimony
of the appellant, as respects other itGms of equipment leased by the Salt Lake County Roads and
Bridges Division.
In summary, the evidence is overwhelmingly
in supoort of three of the four particulars of false
testimony outlined in the indictment and the bill of
particul&rs furnished by the district attorney. Since
only one is sufficient to convict, it is obvious th;J_t
taking the evidence most favorable to the responclent, it must be concluded that the evidence supports
J1
'
1:"1e iury
s ver d'ic t .
I

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTS RULINGS ON THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR REVERSAL.

A.

Testimony of Judge Jones.

The appellant contends that during the testimony of Judge Jones the trial court committed
prejudicial error in not striking from Judg2 Jones'
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answer as to what a particular exhibit was, the
Judge's statement that it was an "amended complaint." Thereafter, appellant goes on to make various arguments in his brief without, in any way, enlightening the reader on what basis he contends
error was made.
The testimony of Judge Jones was obviously
relevant. Judge Jones was the magistrate before
whom the testimony of appellant was given. Exhibit P-1 wc..s a copy of the John Doe complaint which
was the jurisdictional basis of the inquiry before
Judge Jones. It was completely relevant. It was th()
on]v docume11t presented to the jury or read to th:c.:
jury. It n~erely identified the nature of the inquiry
,3nd_ :'::JfOVided the jury with essential information SO
th~t they could understand the rea_son for the app2ll:1ni's +es+irriony before the Judge. At the time
of its offer by the district attorney, the appellant's
counsel objected to the receipt of the document and
took the witness on voire dire. Previously, Judge
Jones had identified the exhibit (Tr. 108)_ Counsel,
apparently after voire dire, objected to the admission of the document, not on the basis of relevancy,
materiality or other evidentiary basis, but upon one
of the same theories he argued for suppression of
Judges Jones' interrogation of Brady. Without reaching that issue, the district attorney sought to lay
further foundation for the admission of the exhibit.
He then took the court file and asked the Judge to
identify E:d1ibit P-2, attached thereto (Tr. 21), so that
the continl ity of fodge fones' action could be determin2d. Tl_--, e Jud::;;·e charc::.cterized the exhibit in the
1
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file as an ''amended complaint" (Tr. 110). An examination of the record reveals that this is probably
what it was in fact. The file document was a photocopy of the original of Exhibit P-1 a.nd Judge Jones
identified the signatures and ma.rkings he made
thereon. Exhibit P-1 was received. (3) Clearly, Exhibit
P-1 was relevant; the "amended complciint" 'NC!.''
not shown to the jury nor identified a.s anything but
a copy of Exhibit P-1. At the time, there was no objection offered to Exhibit P-1 on the basis of its being
"inflamatory." The characterization by Judge Jones
of the photocopy as an "amended complaint"
would hardly, without more, have meant anything tu
the jury. It rested within the sound discretion of th8
court to determine whether the jury could understand the matter. A more innocuous claim of errcr
would be hard to imagine.
Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires any error to be prejudicial and "affect the
substantial rights" of an accused before reversal is
in order. State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530
(1912). Obviously, this action of the trial court, if it
was error at all, was, at the best, the most harmless
error.

B. Testimony of the Witness Nielsen.
The appellant contends that the trial court cor:imitted prejudicial error in admitting into evidence
the testimony of Hubert H. Nielsen as to the preliminary inquiries and negotiations he had with Mr.
(3) The only objection raised was that of "no foundation."
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Boyd Nerdin, the Superintendent of the County
Road Shops, and with Mr. Ted Newsom before the
lease between the county and Midvale Motors, Inc.
was executed for the bitpaver. c4J
Mr. Hubert H. Nielsen was the original owner
of the bitpaver. He was the alter ego of Bonnevill0
Equipment Inc. (Tr. 159). He testified that he ha.cl the
bitpaver for sale in 1963. He testified that he negotiated with Mr. Boyd Nerdin, Superintendent of Salt
Lake County Roads and Bridges, for the machine.
The district attorney asked if he had a conversation
with Nerdin concerning the machine and the court
ruled the conversation to be "res gestae" and part
of a "business transaction." Nielsen testified thereafter that he went into "some detail on the bitpaver
with the idea of trying to interest Salt Lake Count}r
Roads and Bridges in" the machine (Tr. 162). The
following then occurred (Tr. 162):

"O Other than the details of the equipment

itself, was there anything said about the purchase of it or attempt to purchase it?

A Well, natura.lly, when you are trying to sell
something you are talking purchase, buy and
sell.
MR. GUSTIN: I move that be stricken. It is a
conclusion and doesn't purport to be a part of
conversation.
(4) The appellant in his brief implies the conversations took place after
the execution of the lease; this is not true and hence renders inappropriate most of the challenges made in appellant's argument on
the issue.
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THE COURT: The objection is overruled. I
believe it is an insult to the jury to quibble into
this matter. Ask your next question."
Thus, the only evidence was that an effort wa.s
made by Mr. Nielsen to sell the :i:nachine to Salt Lake
County. Contrary to the bold statement in appellant's brieL p. 24, there were negotiations preliminary to a proposed sci.le to Salt Lake County. The
operciJi,-.,~e fact d the conversation that was had with
Nerdin and the subject matter discussed, as well as
the nature of the negotiations, were clearly not hea:-say. They were preliminary facts to show how the
bitpaver transaction occurred and why the appellant perjured himself before Judge Jones. It is well
settled that the hearsay rule is not applicable to
declarations as operative facts. Judge Wahlquist d
cu_~rse, S3-W this and validly overruled the objection. McCormick, Evidence, pp. 463-464 (l 954).
In State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.Vv7.
225 (1930), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
conversations with third persons relaLng to negc
tiations for bribes and the whole transaction \flras admissible as operative facts. The Pennsylvania court
reached a similar conclusion in a prosecution fo~
corrnpt solicitation of a juror, Commonwealth v,
Wiswesser, 134 Pa. Super. 488, 3 A.2d 983 (1939).
Conversations in furtherence of expected trade ari::>
recognized as admissible, Glassma:J. ,,. Barron, 2Tl
Mass. 376, 178 N.E. 628 (1931). See also Wigmoro,
Evidence, 3rd Ed.,§§ 1770, 1772, 1777.
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In Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372
(1953), this court recognized the rule and allowed
conversations at the time of a transaction, noting:
"They are the verbal acts which go to make up
the very transaction which is under scrutiny to determine its legal effect. The fact that promises and
representations were made is material to the issues of
this action; they do not evidence 'the truth of the
matter * * * asserted therein * * *,' at least in the
sense that Wigmore uses that phrase."

See also Wade J., concurring in John C. Cutler
Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 3 Utah2d 107, 279 P.2d 700
(1955):
"However, if the fact of whether or not the statement was made is a material issue in the case, or
the statement accompanies an ambiguous or equivocal act serving to complete and give it definite
legal significance it is a verbal act which constitutes
a material fact in the case or if the fact that such
statement was made is a circumstance which tends
to prove a material issue in the case such a statement is not being used as testimonial evidence of
the statement made on the credit of the person mak
ing the statement who is not a witness and therefore
is not hearsay evidence. Where the 'question is not
whether the statements are true, but whether they
were made' such statements are not excluded by the
rule against hearsay."

Obviously, the objection was properly overruled. The fact that the court characterized counsel's
objection as quibbling was of not compelling consequence. The objection to the evidence had been
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previously overruled, and it appeared that the
court was proper in reminding counsel of the need
to avoid unnecessary interruption and argument.
No prejudice can be assigned on this point.
The next portion of the testimony challenged

it as to whether the appellant's na_me came up in
the conversation. The following occurred (Tr. 163):

"Q Did Commissioner Brady's name come up
in your conversation?

MR. GUSTIN:

A.

Now, if the Court please,-.

(Interposing) Yes.

Q I will ask you, was that with reference to
the purchase of this machine?

A

Yes.

Q I will ask you to relate the conversation as
accurately as you can recall it?

A

Well, I could-.

MR. GUSTIN: If the Court please, that couldn't
have any probative and binding effect on th ,
Defendant. We object to it as being hearsay.
THE COURT: The jury is instructed as follows:
the hearsay principle in law basically is this:
A says to B something that he saw or heard,
and then B comes c_long and recites it as .information that A has. This is distinguished from
-for instance, if I go into a store and make a
business transaction, whether it is completed
or not completed, this is a different thing. A

39
business transaction is a thing just like an object is a thing, and a business transaction may
be testified to regardless of whether someone
else happens to or happens not to recite information. You may continue.
Q.

Your answer to the question then?

A.

Well, I asked Mr. Nerden if he would talk

to Mr. Brady about getting some interest in
the machine, to purchase it.
Was there anything further, any further
conversation at that time?
Q.

A. Well, no sir. He just said that he would do
so. He would contact Mr. Brady and let me
know."
Thus, the same rule is applicable in determining the admissibility of the evidence. Obviously,
the conversation went to negotiations. The record
shows that eventually appellant, Nielsen and Newsom went to Indiana to observe a bitpaver. The
things that caused appellant to take the trip, the preliminary negotiations, were operative facts tendinq
to explain the subsequent event.
As to the third area of challenge to the testimony
of Nielsen and the rulings thereon, the following
occurred:

Q. Subsequent to that conversation, did you
have further conversation with anyone from
Salt Lake County with reference to this machine
or the purchase of this machine?
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MR. GUSTIN: If it please the Court no foundation, leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Answer the question. Did you
have a further conversation, answer yer, or no,
with someone from Salt Lake County, if you can.
A.

Yes, I talked with Mr. Nerden.

THE COURT:

Just a minute. Lay a foundation.

Q. Can you tell us when and where that occurred?
A. Just a few days later, I would say maybe
four or five days.

Q. And, where did that conversation take
place?
A. Well, I met Mr. Nerden on the way home
up on the east bench.
Q.

Was anyone else present?

A.

No, sir.

Will you tell us what was said with reference to the purchase of the machine at that
time?
Q.

A. Mr. Nerden said that he had talked with Mr.
Brady about it, but he said that he says there
is another man that is closer to Mr. Brady than
anybody, whom I suggest that you talk to."
Note, that no objection to this testimony was
made on the grounds of hearsay, so that if such wo.s
the nature of the testimony, the failure to properly

i

I

I

I
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object to it on the appropriate grounds precluded
any claim of error. Hearsay evidence not properly
objected to may be validly received by the jury and
considered by it. Child v. Child, 8 Utah2d 261, 332
P.2d 981 (1958); White v. Newman, 10 Utah2d 62, 348
P.2d 343 (1960); 79 A.L.R.2d 890 et seq. Further, it
is submitted that the evidence was admissible for
two reasons: (1) to show the effect on the hearer, and
(2) part of the business transaction and, hence, an
operative fact.
There is no question that evidence that might
otherwise be characterized as hearsay may be received into evidence to show the effect of the evidence on the hearer. McCormick, Evidence, p. 464
(1954). Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 1789 notes:
"Wherever an utterance is offered to evidence
the state of mind which ensued in another person in
consequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no
assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of
it, and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far
as the Hearsay rule is concerned."

The evidence was admissible to show the information on which Nielsen acted. Emick Motors
Corp v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.
1950). As a result of the conversation, the record is
undisputed that Nielsen got hold of Newsom, had
conversations with him and that the appellant became interested in the bitpaver. Consequently, the
evidence was directly admissible and not objectionable.

42
Also, it is submitted that the evidence was admissible to show the setting of subsequent transactions and, thus, a part of the res gestae of the business transaction.
Finally, a third part of Nielsen's testimony is
challenged by appellant. The district attorney asked
what else had been said, without objection, and received the following answer (Tr. 164):
"A. Well, he said, "I suggest that you talk to
him, Ted Newsom appeared in court, he said, "I
think he might be able to help you on this type of
thing." He is Mr. Brady's gubernatorial campaign
manager and handled his affairs on anything that
might reflect upon him."

Counsel for appellant made a motion to strike
on various grounds only tv10 of which are relevar:~
to this appeal. First, it is contended that the testimony was inflamatory; and, second, it is hearsay.
The court denied the motion to strike. Respondent
submits that the evidence was properly received.
The appellant, having failed to make timely objection, cannot now complain if the evidence was
hearsay. A motion to strike comes too bte. Abbott,
Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., § 352. Further, the
evidence was obviously not hearsay, because it wa.s
offered for the effect on the witness, and as noted
above, is not objectionable as hearsay on such a
basis. Nielsen testified almost immediately thc.t,
thereafter, he made further contact with Ted Newsom in an effort to sell the bitpaver to Salt Lake
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County (Tr. 165). Obviously, the evidence was admissible.
The contention that it was inflamatory and
aimed at prejudicing the jury cannot be accepted.
The evidence was relevant to show Nielsen's actions and the reason in Nielsen's mind for his dealings with Newsom. It also ties Newsom in with the
subsequent trip to Indiana. The evidence was directly relevant. The question of whether the evidence
was inflamatory is a balancing question, McCormick, Evidence, p. 319 (1954-). The trial judge could
determine better than anyone the balance to be
struck. McCormick notes the problem and observes
(p. 320):
"This balancing of intangibles-probative values
against probative dangers-is so much a matter where
wise judges in particular situations may differ that
a lee-way of discretion is generally recognized."

The courts have generally said that under such
circumstances, the matter rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Duvall v. Birden. 124
Conn. 43, 198 Atl. 255 (1938); Thompson v. American
Steel & Wire Co., 317 Pa. 7, 175 Atl. 541 (1934); 31A
C.J.S. Evidence, §§ 437, 438. The evidence can hardly
be said to be so inflamatory as would evoke the
unnessary ire of the jury. Indeed, in the context of
the case as whole, it appears to have been one small
item of little significance. A jury certainly has some
degree of rationalitv and the evidence received,
othervrise relevant and admissible, cannot be said
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to be of such a nature as would upset the rationality
of the jury.
With reference to appellant's assertions of th.~
bad faith of the district attorney, little need be said,
except to note that there was a sound evidentiary
predicate for his actions. The intimidatory nature of
the appellant's ossertions of "warnings" in an effort
to extort the prosecutor from his sworn duty are
most deplorable. They merely underline a conclusion that should be obvious from the record, that in
every lawsuit there are two sides and someon8
usually loses. Appellant, having lost, may, indeed,
feel bitter, but that is no reason to challenge the
integrity of the winning counsel, whose only vice
was a more sound knowledge of the rules of evidence and deft trial ability.
There is no basis for reversal as to Mr. Nielsen's
testimony.
C.

Dur!ng the Testimony of Mr. Russell.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
ruling on the testimony of Mr. Russell as to the question of who was the majority stockholder of Midvale
Motors, Inc. The question was relevant since there
had been testimony previously given that Ted Newsom had represented that he was the majority stockholder of J'v1idvale Motors, Inc., the company thct
bought the bitpaver from Nielsen and leased it to
the county at an exorbitant rate. The check given
Nielsen by Newsom was signed by Newsom as
President of Midvale Motors, Inc. (Tr. 176). The ques-
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tion put to Mr. Russell was as to the truth of Newsom' s assertion and Russell negatived the contention and indicated that Neuman C. Petty was majori'l-y stockholder and president of Midvale Motors,
Inc. This tended to show that Newsom had falsely
represented to make the purchase and then lease
to the county, through the appellant, at an unconscionable price. Therefore, it indicated a scheme
that was not completely proper and, again, provided
a motive for the appellant's untruthful testimony before Judge Jones.
The test of relevancy is whether it is probative
and all that is required is "the relation between the
propositions for which the evidence is offered and
the issues in the case," McCormick, Evidence, p. 315
(1954). It need only "tend to establish the inference
for which it is offered." McCormick, op. cit. p. 317;
Redomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, ?i83 (9t.i.i
Cir. 1950). Applying the above test to the sifoation
faced by the trial judge, it is clear that the evidence
was relevant. The court's comment that the jury
would judge the relevancy was merely another way
of advising counsel that the evidence met the test
of admissibility and the jury would determine its
significance. It should be remembered that trial
judges are under the pressure of the case and the
articulation of the basis of their ruling may be less
than perfect. However, since the evidence was
otherwise admissible, the appellant is in no position
to complain.
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In addition, it can hardly be said that such a ruling would be more than harmless error.

D. Testimony of the Witness Jensen.
Appellant, as his final challenge to the court's
handling of the evidence, contends impropriety
with reference to the testimony of Commissioner
Jensen. The basis of the appellant's challenge is
predicated on an assumption that Exhibit 15 was
only offered in "bad faith" and that it was without
probative value. As noted before, infra p. ________ , the
evidence had direct bearing on the motive of appellant in failing to disclose the lease of the AllesChalmers tractor that was leased to the county. The
refusal of appellant to truthfully reveal the lease,
which was still in effect at the time of his testimony
before Judge Jones, must have been predicated, in
part, on the realization that this would lead to the
disclosure of the proposed lease, Exhibit 15, which
was sought by appellant, and was to be executed
before the equipment was sold to Motor Lease, Inc,
and after the county had the equipment, unless
Exhibit 18< 5) was a total fraud.
Exhibit 15 was a lease that appellant strongly
urged Jensen to adopt, and said he would take before the commission. Jensen told the appellant that
the lease was for payments of over $80,000.00. The
appellant then appeared surprised and called a_ Mr.
Browning, his assistant. The proposed lease of ap(5) Exhibit 18 was a one-month lease for part of the month of May
through part of June. The lease started before Motor Lease, Inc.
owned the tractor.
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proximately $80,000.00 would have been a fantastic
waste of public money, since the machine was purchased by Motor Lease, Inc. for about one-half of
the lease rental.
With such a situa_tion, it seems probable that the
appellant would have failed to disclose the subsequent leases (which were open to question since
they exceed the purchase price of the tractor). Thus,
Exhibit 15 was a piece of evidence directly tending
to substantiate the a_ppellant's motive for perjury.
As to the bad faith contention, it is interesting to
note (a) the trial judge found the evidence relevant,
(b) the jury apparently was not offended by its relevance to the claim of perjury, (c) there is a legitimate
legal premise for its admission, and (d) the Attorney
General finds a direct relationship between Exhibit
15 and the position of respondent on appeal. The
assertion of bad faith vanishes. See also infra p. --------·
Appellant must live with his wrongdoings and
urgent attempts to transfer the blame to the prosecution cannot sustain his position on appeal.

E.

Summary of Appellant's Claims of Eviden-

tiary Error.

The appellant ha.s placed a summary of contentions in his brief with reference to the alleged
errors of the trial court in ruling on the admissibility.
Respondent has cited its authorities and set forth
its rebuttal argument in the portion of its brief where
each contention of error is discussed. Consequently,
there is little need to rehash the claims of hearsay,
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bad faith or relevance. Appellant's arguments are
not applicable to the facts of this case.
However, respondent feels it important to rebut
any contention made by the appellant that the trial
judge abandoned his role in ruling on the evidence
to the discretion of the jury. In actual fact, all the
court did was leave to the jury the determination
of what weight the jury should accord to otherwi3e
relevant evidence. Although juries may not have
the sophistication of counsel, they generally have
the sophistication and maturity of the experience of
life. Recent studies have shown the jury to have
unusual wisdom and insight and to use reasonable
judgment, Joines, Civil Justice and the Jury (1962).
It is submitted that it is clear from the record
that when the discretion of the trial judge is weighed
against the whole case, there was no error, or if
there was, it was so slight as to be harmless.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO
THE JURY OR IN NOT GIVING THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS OF APPELLANT.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in giving instructions No. 2 and No. 15, in that they
were erroneous, and that other instructions (Nos.
14, 15, 16, and 6) contained defects.
Instruction No. 2, set out in appellant's brief,
p. 56, merely appraises the jury of the allegations
in the indictment and instructed the jury on the
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prosecution's theory of the case. The instruction was
not given in the abstract, but was tailored to the
evidence and issues that had been raised before
the court. The instruction also highlighted for the
jury the four areas wherein the prosecution alleged
that the appellant had perjured himself. The court
framed the instruction so that the procedural circumstances of the appellant appearing before Judge
Jones were intelligible against the allegations in the
indictment. This action of the trial judge was clearly
what he was compelled to do, if he were to comply
with cases previously decided by this court. In State
v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946), this
court criticized the trial court for not doing what the
trial judge in this case did. The court observed:
"We have repeatedly criticized the giving of abstract statements of the law to the jury, and held
that it is the duty of the court to apply the law to
the facts supported by the evidence and to not instruct on any question which is not involved in the
case under the evidence. (citing cases) We think
that it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the
court should apply the law to the facts as they appear from the evidence, and should instruct only on
the law which has a bearing on facts, and in stating
the necessary elements to constitute the crime
charged it should submit to the jury the facts involved in the case and not merely generalizations,
and where possible should avoid the use of technical legal terms and cumbersome definitions thereof,
by using terms which will readily be understood by
laymen. In that way, the jury will be given a much
clearer understanding of its problems."
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Thus, this court has heretofore expressed ils
position in favor of tailoring the law to the facts in
such a manner as would make the instruction meaningful in the context of the case in which it is given.
Indeed, the posture of the State's case was pinpointed in reference to the State's factual allegations.
Appellant, it would seem, would have had the judge
instruct on abstract rules of law. By properly tailo:::-ing the instructions and pinpointing the essential
contentions of the prosecution, he was helping the
jury to see the particular issues they were required
to determine. Appellant complains that in Instruction No. 2, the jury was advised that the failure of
appellant to reveal the Alles-Chalmers tractor that
was leased was the essence of the question of
whether the appellant perjured himself in spea_king
to the question of other leased equipment. This was
the very contention of the prosecution and the only
issue of evidence on the matter; consequently, it
was perfectly proper for the court to pinpoint the
issue against the facts. The court was not compelled
to charge the jury in the exact language of the indictment so long as the instruction otherwise reasonably informs the jury of the law applicable to the
case. Indeed, in the Thompson case, supra, this
court encouraged trial courts to refrain from using
technical legal language. There is no error on this
point.
Appellant's second contention is that the court
erred in giving Instruction No. 15. The respondent
submits that there is absolutely no merit to this point.
The instruction must be examined as whole to see
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if it adequately explains the law to the jury. The first
sentence of Instruction No. 15 advises the jury of
the required standard of proof in witnesses and corroborating circumstances. The second paragraph
defines what is a corroborating circumstance. The
third paragra_ph, which is the paragraph to which
appellant objects, explains that corroborative circumstances can be circumstantial or direct and that
the entire conduct as witness in his own behalf "before a city judge" and at other times may provide
the corroboration. It is submitted that the instruction,
when taken as a whole, is adequate and not prejudicial.
Appellant says that the district attorney took
exception to Instruction No. 15, which is true; however, thereafter, the court amended the instruction
by interlineation and confined the testimony portion
of the instruction to the appellant's apeparance in
the city court. This avoided a possible inference
from his failure to take the stand in his own behalf.
Therefore, no ground can be claimed by the appellant from the district attorney's action.
The appellant's claim that the instruction emasculates the so-called "quantitative rule," required,
in some instances, in proof of perjury, is without
merit. The instruction merely advises the jury of
certain sources that may be considered in determining whether the required corroboration has been
shown.
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In 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, p. 38, it is observed:
"The corroboration of a single witness for the
prosecution in a perjury case may be by circumstantial evidence."

In addition, in 41 Am. Jur., Perjury,
served in part:

§

68, it is ob-

"As a general rule, evidence of conduct showing
consciousness of guilt, such as flight, may serve as a
requisite corroborative circumstance to a statement
of an accusing witness warranting conviction under
an indictment for perjury. Motive and design to commit a crime, if proved, may also be considered a guilty
circumstance and, consequently, may serve legally a.s
corroborative evidence."

See also Anno. 111 A.LR. 828.
Thus, the court's instruction was not improper.
Additionally, as noted before, the quantitative evidence rule is of doubtful application in Utah, at
least to the extent appellant urges.
The appellant's contention that the instruction
somehow would cause the jury to believe that th1-:::
appellant was charged in the John Doe complaint
with the crime set forth is a torturous assertion. At
the time the instruction was given, the jury had
heard all the vidence and knew of the documents.
They knew that the appellant and others were
called as witnesses subsequent to the issuance cf
Exhibit P-1. They were, it is submitted, more likely
to believe the truth as set forth in the evidence that
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the appellant was, along with others, interrogated
to see if he knew or took part in the wrongdoing
alleged. There could, therefore, have been no preJudice to appellant from Instruction No. 15.
Appellant finally merely asserts that Instruction
No. 14 is inconsistent with Instructions 15 and 16, but
does not disclose the nature of the inconsistency.
Instruction No. 14 merely defines direct and circumstantial evidence and in no way is inconsistent with
Instructions 15 and 16.
Further, the assertions with reference to Instruction No. 6 that it is unintelligible and incomprehensible is argumentative, and a reading of the instruction, in light of all the instructions given,
supports a conclusion that it provides no basis for
a claim of prejudicial error.
This court has on numerous occasions specified
that in determining a claim of insufficiency or erroneous instructions, that the instructions given must
be viewed as a whole. State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah
267, 258 P.2d 452 (1952); State v. Evans, 107 Utah 1,
151P.2d196 (1944); State v. Coleman, 17 Utah2d 166,
406 P.2d 308 (1965). When the instructions given in
the instant case are viewed in accordance with the
above rule, it is clear that they were adequate and
provide no basis for reversal.
Finally, appellant contends that the court should
have given his requested instructions Nos. 2 and 3.
Instruction No. 3 was merely a statement on the required evidence to prove perjury. However, the in-
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struction is apparently little different than Instruction No. 15, as given by the court. Only the language
of Instruction No. 15 is challenged, not the substantive explanation of the law.
It is well settled that a party has a right to have
the jury instructed in the language of his proposed
instructions, if the law is otherwise adequately
stated. In People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac.
737 (1891), this court observed:
"While the above instrution was not given in the
language of the learned counsel presenting them, yet
it embodies the substance of the request, and leaves
the question to the jury as a circumstance for them
to consider, and to say whether, under all the facts
and circumstances shown, possession of stolen property was evidence of guilt or not; and at the same
time the court instructed the jury that possession
alone is not sufficient evidence upon which to convict. These instructions were given with reference
to the proofs before them at the time, which the jury
must have understood and applied with reference to
such facts of possession as were shown; and, while
the instruction was not as full and explicit as it
might have been, yet it sufficiently covered the question presented.
* * * *
Where the charge of the court, as a whole, covered the questions embraced in the request to charge,
so as to fairly submit them to the jury, and leave the
question for them to pass upon, it is not error to refuse the request to charge, though technically good in
law. In such cases the court is not bound to use the
language of the counsel, but may use his own."
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See also, Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed.,
663.
The same conclusion applies to the appellant's
contention as to his requested Instruction No. 2. The
material was adequately covered in Instructions 3
a.nd 5, as given.

It is submitted that when the instructions given
are ta_ken as a whole and in light of the evidence
and posture of the case, there was no prejudicial
error warranting reversal.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY OVERRULED
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
TESTIMONY OF JUDGE JONES.

The appellant argues on appeal that the testimony of Judge Jones should have been suppressed.
On appeal, two bases are urged for the contention.
First, it is asserted that since the complaint signed
by Delmar Larson did not expressly state that the
name of the accused person was unknown, this prevented the proceeding from being a proper one. It
is submitted that this is a hypertechnical assertion.
The use of the name John Doe was a sufficient
means of alleging the lack of identity of the accused.
No particular form is required to state lack of knowledge, and the use of the term "John Doe" universal1y is understood to have a meaning that the actual
name is unknown. Even so, this would not be a.

56
basis for suppression. In 41 Am. Jur., Perjury,
it is stated:

§

25,

"Generally, the fact that jurisdiction of a
court which has general jurisdiction of an offense docs
not properly attach to the particular case in which
the perjury charged is alleged to have been committed, because the complaint in the case has not been
sworn to, does not defeat the charge of perjury. Moreover, while perjury cannot be assigned on alleged false testimony given in the course of a trial,
where the court has no jurisdiction of the offense
charged or of the defendant, yet if the proceedings
are merely erroneous or voidable, even if there are
such irregularities or defects as will require a reversal of the cause on appeal, false testimony given
in the course of such trial, if material, constitutes
perjury. Hence, perjury may be assigned on the testimony in a criminal trial before justices, nothwithstanding the warrant on which the defendant in such
trial was arrested was illegal, having been issued without a written oath or information."

The allegation of appellant, when accepted in a
light most favorable to him, shows only a minor irregularity at best. Consequently, this would be no
basis for suppression.
The second basisC 6) upon which appellant contends the testimony he gave before Judge Jones
should be suppressed is on the theory that his testimony was given as a deposition and, consequently,
he should have been given an opportunity to examine the deposition and make what changes he
(6) Appellant challenged the proceedings on several other grounds, but
has abandoned those on appeal.
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desired and then sign it. It is submitted that there
is no merit to such a contention.
Section 77-11-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was
the section under which Judge Jones was proceeding when appellant appeared before him. That section reads:
"When a complaint is made before a magistrate
charging a person with the commission of a crime or
public offense, such magistrate must examine the
complaint, under oath, as to his knowledge of the
commission of the offense charged, and he may also
examine any other persons and may take their depositions."

The section allows the magistrate to "examine
any other persons and take their depositions." When
the appellant appeared before Judge Jones, he was
examined. He was administered an oath and swore
to tell the truth. He was, thereafter, interrogated
concerning the "John Doe" complaint pending before the magistrate. This was an examination and
a judicial proceeding. The conjunctive allows the
magistrate to have the testimony reduced to writing.
The deposition is a distinct certification apart from
the examination made under oath by the witness.
Section 76-45-1(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"A person is guilty of perjury who
(1) Swears or affirms that he will truly testify,
declare, depose or certify, or that any testimony,
declaration, deposition, certificate, affidavit or other
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writing by him subscribed is true, in, or in connection
with, any action or special proceeding, hearing, or
inquiry ,or on any occasion in which an oath is required by law or is necessary for the prosecution or
defense of a private right or for the ends of public
justice or may lawfully be administered, and who in
such action or proceeding or on such hearing, inquiry
or other occasion willfully and knowinnly testifies.
declares, deposes or certifies falsely or states in hi3
testimony, declaration, deposition, affidavit or certif- i
icate any matter to be true which he knows to b2 i
false."

Thus, a_ny false testimony given at any hearinc;r
or inquiry, or in any deposition is perjury, assuming the presence of other elements. Consequently,
the magistrate's examination was a sufficient judicial
proceeding to make the rendition of folse oral testimony perjurious. In, Burdick, Law of Crime, Vol. I,
§ 328, it is observed:
"It is necessary at common law in order to constitute perjury, that the false testimony be given in
a judicial proceeding, but that term is a very broad
one. It may be either in a court of law or of equity,
but it need not be before any court; it may be before commissioners, in an answer in chancery; upon
some collateral matter not directly connected with
the issue of a cause on trial, or an affidavit to hold
to bail; or when one offering himself as bail, swears
his property to be greatGr than it is; or the crime
may be committed in some court of justice having
power to administer oath, or before some magistrate
invested with similar autho:rity, in some proceeding
relative to a civil suit or criminal prosecution.
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It has also been held perjury in a judicial proceeding where one falsely takes a poor debtor's oath
before a magistrate, or gives false testimony under
oath before a grand jury, or where a juror testifies
falsely when examined on his voir dire."

Thus, this was a judicial proceeding within the
perjury statute. The normal giving of a deposition
in a civil matter may not be. In any event, the subsequent transaction of the appellant's testimony
imposed no greater requirement and the false oral
testimony before the magistrate was enough to meet
the statutory elements for perjury. See also Clark &
Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., Wingersky, p. 916.
Appellant argues that since Section 77-44-2,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes the rules of evidence applicable in criminal cases that are applicable in civil cases, a requirement of authentication is
necessary. It is submitted that the procedure appelland arques for is not a_ rule of evidence, but one
of procedure, and Section 77-44-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is inapplicable.
Section 76-45-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
must be read in light of Section 76-45-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and when so done, it is apparent
that false ori'll testimony in a proceeding before a
m'.1gistrate is sufficient. Further, lack of authentication is no defense, since Section 76-45-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides that an irregularity in administering the oath is no defense. It is submitted
tha_t this -vro-i_,~ld be a similar situation, a minor irregularity that would not remove the taint of false,
sworn testimony orally given, 70 CJS, Perjury 22 C.
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It is submitted that the trial court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
POINT V.
THE INDICTMENT RETURNED BY THE SALT
LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY WAS SUFFICIENT.

The appellant, as his final claim on appeal, contends that the indictment returned by the Salt Lak:G
County Grand Jury, charging him with perjury in
the first degree, was defective and that the trial
court should have granted his motion to quash. The
essence of the appellant's contention is a claim thot
it is essential to sustain an indictment for perjury
that the form of an indictment contain an annotation
either (1) that the testimony given was material or
(2) that the materiality of the alleged testimony be
spelled out in the indictment. It is submitted that
there is no merit to the appellant's position.
The first case in Utah considering the sufficiency of an indictment for perjury was People v. Greenwell, 5 Utah 112 (1886). It is admitted that in the
Greenwell case, the indictment expressly mentioned that the testimony given before a grand jury
in Weber County, Territory of Utah, was material.
However, a reading of that case shows that there
is no precedent for an allegation that materiality
must be set forth with particularity under presentday pleading standards, since under the Criminal
Practice Act of 1878 and Sections 164 and 158 thereunder, which was in effect at the time of the Green-
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well case, the statutes expressly made mandatory
the recitation of materiality.
In State v. Anderson. 35 Utah 496, 101 Pac. 385
(1909), the appellant was charged with perjury. The
sufficiency of the indictment was challenged upon
the concept of duplicity. It is worth noting that in
the Anderson case, the court noted that under Section 46110, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, only four
elements were necessary to sustain a complaint,
and the information in the Anderson case did not
specifically mention materiality, although, admittedly, the facts pleaded were sufficient to show materiality. Neither the Anderson case nor the Greenwell
case dealt with present requirements of pleading.
Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets
forth the general standards for informations and indictments. This provision was enacted in 1935, Laws
of Utah 1935, Chapter 118, Section 1, and was part
of a general modernization of the State Code of
Criminal Procedure, based upon the American Law
Institute's Model Code, promulgated in 1930. The
above section now provides:
"(1) The information or indictment may charge,
and is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense
for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or
more of the following ways:

(a) By using the name given to the offense by
the common law or by a statute.
(b) By stating so much of the definition of the
offense, either in terms of the common law or
of the statute defining the offense or in terms
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of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice
of what offense is intended to be charged.
(2) The information or indictment may refer
to a section or subsection of any statute creating
the offense charged therein, and in determining the
validity or sufficiency of such information or indictment regard shall be had to such reference." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, an information or indictment is sufficient, if
it charges the crime in any one of the ways set forth
in Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Subsection l(a) of the above cited section provides that
the offense is sufficient for judicial purposes, if the
name given it by common law or the statutory reference is plead. The indictment in the instant case
is sufficient for two reasons: (1) the statutory reference is contained in the indictment, and (2) the indictment expressly refers to the crime of perjury in
the first degree.
In State v. Hill, 100 Utah 456, 116 P.2d 392 (1941),
this court acknowledged that the purpose of the new
form of pleading was clearly to get away from the
technicalities of pleading that existed at common
law. This position was reaffirmed in State v. Landrum, 3 Utah2d 372, 284 P.2d 693 (1965), upholding a
conviction of the crime of robbery, where the information merely charged that defendant robbed
victim. Thus, there is a clear statutory evolution
away from the technicalities of pleading that were
required at the time of People v. Greenwell, supra.
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It is submitted that the indictment in this case, hav-

ing met one of the statutory standards, is sufficient.
In State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.2d 455
(1942), this court was charged with considering the
sufficiency of a perjury information. The court
noted, with reference to Section 77-21-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953:
"Section 105-21-8 of Chapter 118, Laws of Utah
1935, quoted supra, provides that an offense may be
charged in an information in three ways: (a) By
using the name given by the statute; (b) By stating
enough of the terms of the statute defining the offense as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice as to which offense is intended to be
charged; or (c) By citation of, or reference to, the
section or subsection of the statute creating the offense charged in the information."

The court then went on to observe:
"Conformance with either of these three permissive ways of charging the offense would have apprised the court and the defendant of what offense
was intended to be charged so the plea could be
entered, defense prepared and the penalty be known
and opposed, if such steps become necessary."

Thus, the Spencer case is direct precedent in this
jurisdiction for the conclusion that since the indictment in this case complied with the statutory standards of Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
that appellant's objection was unmeritorious, and
the trial court properly denied the motion to quash.
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Further, it should be noted that the indictment
in the instant case met the recommended statutory
form set forth in Section 77-21-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Admittedly, these forms are exemplary. State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 121 P.2d 912
(1942). However, in this instance, by using a statutory
form, the statutory criteria in Section 77-21-8, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, were fully complied with.
In State v. Hutchinson, 4 Utah2d 404, 295 P.2d
345 (1956), this court overruled the Spencer case on
other grounds. However, in doing so, it did indicate
that compliance with the statutory form of pleading
recommended in Section 77-21-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was sufficient. This court said:
"Without determining the debatable question as
to whether this language was dictum or not, logic
would dictate that without such language the conclusion is almost inescapable that one offense was
included in the other and an accusation of perjury,
without specifying the degree, would have been suf·
ficient, since applicable statutes seem to say so and
actually authorize perjury in the following form:
'A. B. committed perjury by testifying as follows:."
(Emphasis added.)

The respondent admits that some cases have
definitely advocated a proposition of expressly indicating the materiality of the testimony in the indictment or information. However, there is a very
definite split of authority, which seems to depend
upon the particular statutory or procedural rule in
effect in the jurisdiction, 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, § 44.
See also 70 C.J.S., Perjury,§ 44.
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Most recently, in State v. Burch, 413 P.2d 805
(Utah 1966), an appellant from a burglary conviction,
challenged the sufficiency of the information. This
court rejected the contention, finding the information sufficient and stated:
"Defendant says the information was insufficient to support the conviction. We think there is no
merit in this contention, since it contained the name
of the offense and the statute under which it was
drawn."

The court cited State v. Courtney, 10 Utah2d 200, 350
P.2d 619 (1960), in support of its conclusion. A similar
result was reached in State v. Dodge, 415 Pac. 212
(Utah 1966).
Other states have apparently recognized that
there is no necessity for an allegation of the materiality of the perjury under procedures of pleading
comparable to those in Utah.
In State v. Hawley, 186 N.C. 432 119 SE 88 (1923),
the North Carolina Supreme Court was charged
with considering the effect of the short form of indictment or information on the requisite of pleading
the materiality of the alleged perjured testimony.
The court concluded that although the failure would
have been fatal under previous statutes, that the enactment of the new provision dispensed with the
necessity of an allegation as to the materiality of
the perjured testimony.
States immediately surrounding Utah, having
comparable statutory provisions and a similar ident-
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ity of interest, have rejected the contention now
urged by the appellant.
In State v. Chee, 74 Ariz. 402, 250 P.2d 985 (1952),
the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that under the new
Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect in Arizona, an
indictment which charged the accused with falsely
answering a question as a witness before a grand
jury in a manner very comparable to that charged
in the instant case, was a sufficient allegation, and
the absence of an allegation as to materiality would
not affect the sufficiency of the indictment.
In People v. Swanson. 109 Col. 371, 125 P.2d
637 (1942), the Colorado Supreme Court noted that
the indictment involved followed the identical
forms prescribed by statute, and found the reference
to materiality unnecessary.
It is submitted, therefore, that the absence of
an allegation of materiality is not such a sufficient
defect as would warrant a conclusion that the indictment in this case was fatally defective. The cases
cited in appellant's brief in support of his contention either involve cases where the common law
form of pleading or a derivative thereof is the
standard procedural code of pleading, or involve
cases decided well before the promulgation of the
American Law Institute' s Model Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1930, upon which the Utah procedure
is based.
This court, in State v. Hill, supra, took an identically inopposite conclusion as to the constitutional-
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ity of the procedural form of a pleading than tha.t
taken in State v. Webber. 78 Vt. 463, 62 Atl. 1018
(1906), upon which appellant relies.
The indictment in the instant case clearly alleges that the appellant testified falsely before the
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, judge of the City Court
of Salt Lake City, after having been duly sworn, and
testified "to the following material facts." (R.l).
Generally, as noted in 41 Am. Jur., Perjury,§ 44,
an indictment is sufficient "by showing an action at
issue in a court of competent jurisdiction, the testimony given, coupled with the averment that it was
material to the issue." This was the action taken in
the indictment in the instant case and is, therefore,
generally sufficient. 80 A.LR. § 1443.
It is submitted that there is no merit to the appellant's contention. He was adequately apprised,
both at the time he appeared before Judge Jones
and subsequent to the indictment, of the allegations
against him. Appellant's urgings at this appeal
would ask this court to turn the clock back on the
modernization of criminal justice in the area of
pleading. This court has refused to do so on numerous occasions. State v. Robbins, 102 Utah 119, 127
P.2d 1042; State v. Avery, 102 Utah 33, 125 P.2d 803;
State v. Landrum, supra; State v. Hill. supra; State v.
Courtney, supra; State v. Burch. supra; and State v.
Dodge, supra. Obviously, therefore, the appellant
cannot contend that the indictment was insufficient
upon which to sustain the prosecution.
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The appellant's contention on the necessity of
spelling out the matter of inquiry before the grand
jury is also, for the above reasons, without merit.
CONCLUSION

The appellant has challenged his conviction
on several grounds, the primary of which is the insufficiency of the evidence. When the evidence is
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
it is obvious that it is sufficient to sustain appellant's
conviction. Appellant has challenged the good faith
of the trial judge, the district attorney, and the very
proceedings before which he falsely gave testimony. It is submitted that there is no benefit to the
appellant's attempts to place the guilt upon everyone but himself. At the time of trial, he offered no
explanation for his conduct, and the evidence sufficiently sustained the jury's verdict. Allegations
that prejudicial error was committed in the evidence
and instructions are not sustained, when subjected
to scrutiny. Appellant's contention that the evidence
of his perjury should have been suppressed is based
upon a hypertechnical argument and not sustained
by analysis or authority. Finally, the allegation as
to the insufficiency of the indictment melts in the
presence of close analysis, and there is no merit
to this position.
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When the full nature of the proceedings are
ezamined against the allegations which appellant
now claims require reversal, it is apparent that there
is no merit to his position on appeal.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
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